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ABSTRACT
Assessing and understanding intelligent agents is a difficult
task for users that lack an AI background. A relatively new
area, called “Explainable AI,” is emerging to help address
this problem, but little is known about how users would for-
age through information an explanation system might offer.
To inform the development of Explainable AI systems, we
conducted a formative study — using the lens of Information
Foraging Theory — into how experienced users foraged in the
domain of StarCraft to assess an agent. Our results showed that
participants faced difficult foraging problems. These foraging
problems caused participants to entirely miss events that were
important to them, reluctantly choose to ignore actions they
did not want to ignore, and bear high cognitive, navigation,
and information costs to access the information they needed.
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INTRODUCTION
Real-time strategy (RTS) games are a popular test bed for arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) research, and platforms supporting such
research continue to improve (e.g., [40]). The RTS domain
is challenging for AI due to real-time adversarial planning
requirements within sequential, dynamic, and partially observ-
able environments [29]. Since these constraints transfer to
the real world, improvements in RTS agents can be applied to
other domains, for example, mission planning and execution
for AI systems trained to control a fleet of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) in simulated environments [37]. However,
the intersection of two complex domains, such as AI and flight,
poses challenges: who is qualified to assess behaviors of such
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a system? For example, how can a domain expert, such as
a flight specialist, assess whether the system is making its
decisions for the right reasons?
If a domain expert making such assessments is not an expert
in the complex AI models the system is using, there is a gap
between the knowledge they need to make such assessments
vs. the knowledge they have in the domain. To close this gap,
a growing area known as “Explainable AI” aims to enable do-
main experts to understand complex AI system by requesting
explanations. Prior work has shown that such explanations
can improve mental models [16, 18], user satisfaction [14],
and users’ ability to effectively control the system [1, 3, 17].
However, little is known about what an RTS domain expert’s
information needs are – what they need to have explained, in
what sequence, and at what cognitive and time costs. There-
fore, to inform explanation systems in this area, we conducted
a formative study of how experienced RTS players would
go about trying to understand and assess an intelligent agent
playing the RTS game of StarCraft.
Our setting was StarCraft replay files. A StarCraft replay file
contains an action history of a game, but no information about
the players (i.e., no pictures of players and no voice audio).
This anonymized set-up enabled us to tell our participants
that one of the players was an AI agent. (We detail this de-
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Figure 1. A screenshot from our study, with participants anonymized
(bottom right corner). Some important regions are marked with red
boxes, including: (1: bottom left) The Minimap offers a birds-eye view
enabling participants navigate around the game map. (2: top left) Partic-
ipants can use a drop-down menu to display the Production tab for a sum-
mary of the build actions currently in progress. (3, middle right) Time
Controls allow participants to rewind/fast forward, change the speed.
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sign further in the Methodology section.) In addition, the
participants had functionality to seek additional information
about the replay, such as navigating around the game map,
drilling down into production information, pausing, rewinding,
fast-forwarding, and so on (Figure 1).
However, we wanted a higher level of abstraction than features
specific to StarCraft. Specifically, we aimed for (1) applicabil-
ity to other RTS environments, and (2) connection with other
research about humans seeking information. To that end, we
turned to Information Foraging Theory (IFT).
IFT has a long history of revealing useful and usable infor-
mation functionalities in other information-rich domains, es-
pecially web environments (e.g., [33]) and software develop-
ment environments (e.g., [8, 31]). Originally based on classic
predator-prey models in the wild, its basic constructs are the
predator (information seekers like our participants) seeking
prey (information goals) along pathways marked by cues (sign-
posts) in an information environment (such as the StarCraft
replay environment). The predator decides which paths to
navigate by weighing the expected cost of navigating the path
against the expected value of the location to which it leads.
Drawing from this theory, we framed our investigation using
the following research questions (RQs):
RQ1 The Prey: What kind of information do domain experts
seek, how do they ask about it, and for what reasons?
RQ2 The Foraging Paths: What paths do domain experts
follow in seeking their prey, why, and at what cost?
RQ3 The Decisions and the Cues: What decision points do
domain experts consider to be most critical, and what cues
lead them astray from these decision points?
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
When assessing whether an AI agent is making its decisions
for the right reasons, humans automatically develop mental
models of the system [28]. Mental models, defined as “internal
representations that people build based on their experiences in
the real world,” enable users to predict system behavior [28].
Ideally, mental models of a system would help people gain
the understanding they need to assess an AI agent, but this
is not always the case. Tullio et al. [38] examined mental
models for a system that predicted the interruptibility of their
managers. They found that the overall structure of their partic-
ipants’ mental models was largely unchanged over the 6 week
study, although they did discount some initial misconceptions.
However, their study did not deeply engage in explanation; it
was mostly visualization. In other work, Bostandjiev et al. [3]
studied a music recommendation system and found that expla-
nation led to a remarkable increase in user-satisfaction. In an
effort to improve mental models by increasing transparency
of a machine learning system, Kulesza et al. [16] identified
principles for explaining (in a “white box” fashion) how a
machine learning based system makes its predictions more
transparent to the user. In their study, participants using a
prototype following the principles observed an improvement
of their mental model quality by up to 52%.
Several studies have also found that explanations have been
able to improve users’ ability to actually control the system.
Stumpf et al. [36] investigated how users responded to explana-
tions of machine learning predictions, finding that participants
were willing to provide a wide range of feedback in an effort
to improve the system. Kulesza et al. [17] found that the par-
ticipants who were best able to customize recommendations
were the ones who had adjusted their mental models the most
in response to explanations about the recommender system.
Further, those same participants found debugging more worth-
while and engaging. Kapoor et al. [14] found that interacting
with explanations enabled users to construct classifiers that
were more aligned with target preferences, alongside increased
satisfaction. Beltran et al. [1] presented a novel gestural ap-
proach to querying text databases, allowing users to refine
queries by providing reasons why the result was correct or in-
correct. Their results indicated that action explanation allowed
for more efficient query refinement.
However, in the domain of intelligent agents in RTS games,
although there is research into AI approaches [29], there is
only a little research investigating what humans need or want
explained. Cheung et al. [5] studied how people watch the RTS
genre, creating personas for various types of viewers. Metoyer
et al. [25] studied how experienced players explained the RTS
domain to novice users while demonstrating how to play the
game. Finally, McGregor et al.’s [24] work is also pertinent,
describing support for testing and debugging in settings with
thousands of decisions being made sequentially. The work
most similar to our own is Kim et al.’s [15] study of intelligent
agent assessment in StarCraft. Their study invited experienced
players to assess skill levels and overall performance of AI
bots by playing against them. They observed that the humans’
ranking differed from an empirical ranking based on the bots’
win rate at AI competitions. Our study differs from theirs
in that our participants did not play, but instead strove to
understand and explain by interacting with a game replay.
In everyday conversation, people obtain explanations by ask-
ing questions. Drawing upon this point, Lim et al. [22] have
categorized questions people ask about AI systems in terms of
“intelligibility types.” In their work, they investigated partici-
pants’ information demands about context-aware intelligent
systems powered by decision trees, determining which expla-
nation types provided the most benefit to users. They found
the most often demanded questions were Why and Why not
(Why did or didn’t the system do X?). We provide more details
of that work and build upon it in when we discuss RQ1 results.
In recognition of the particular importance of these two types
of questions, researchers have been working on Why and Why
not explanations in domains such as database queries [2, 13],
robotics [12, 23, 34], email classification [19], and pervasive
computing [39]. These types of explanations have also at-
tracted attention from the social sciences, which seek to help
ground AI researchers’ efforts in cognitive theories [26]. Other
research has demonstrated that the intelligibility type(s) the
system supported impact which aspects of users’ attitudes are
affected. For example, Cotter et al. [7] found that justify-
ing why an algorithm works the way it does (but not how it
works) increased users’ confidence (blind faith) in the system
— but not for improving their trust (beliefs which inform a full
cost-benefit analysis) in the system. Further, it seems that the
relative importance of the intelligibility types may vary from
one domain to another. For example, Castelli et al. [4] found
that in the smart homes domain, users showed a strong interest
in What questions, but few of the other intelligibility types.
We drew upon Information Foraging Theory (IFT) to investi-
gate the information that people would seek in the RTS domain.
In IFT terms, when deciding where to forage for informa-
tion, predators (our participants) make cost/benefit estimates,
weighing the information value per time cost of staying in the
current patch (location on the game map or tab with supple-
mental information) versus navigating to another patch [33].
However, predators are not omniscient: they decide based
on their perceptions of the cost and value of the available
options. Predators form these perceptions using their prior
experience with similar patches [31] and the cues (signposts
in their information environment like links and indicators) that
point toward various patches. Of course, predators’ perceived
values and costs are often inaccurate [32].
IFT constructs have been used to understand humans’
information-seeking behavior in other domains, particularly
web navigation [6, 9], debugging [8, 20, 31], and other soft-
ware development tasks [27, 30, 32, 35]. However, to our
knowledge, it has not been used in RTS environments like
StarCraft. Our paper aims to help fill this gap.
METHODOLOGY
We conducted a pair think-aloud study, where participants
worked to understand and explain the behavior of an intelligent
agent playing StarCraft II, a real-time strategy (RTS) game.
We used the pair think-aloud design to capture their ongoing
efforts to understand the behaviors they witnessed.
StarCraft II is a popular RTS game [29] that has been used
for AI research [40]. The particular match1 we used featured
professional players and was part of a top level tournament.
The replay we chose to analyze was a representative sample in
terms of game flow, e.g., initially building up economy, some
scouting, transitioning to increasing combat [29].
Because we were interested in how participants would go
about understanding an intelligent agent’s behaviors, we hid
the players’ names, instead displaying them as Human and
CPU1, and told participants that one of the players was under
AI control — even though that was untrue. To encourage them
to aim for a real understanding of an agent that might have
weaknesses, we also told them the AI was not fully developed
and had some flaws. Participants were generally convinced
that the player was an AI. For example, Pair5-P10 speculated
about the implementation, “he must have been programmed
to spam.” Participants did notice, however, the AI at times
behaved like a human:
1We used game 3 of the match between professional players ByuL
and Stats during the IEM Season XI - Gyeonggi tournament. The
IEM tournament series is denoted as a “Premier Tournament,” by
TeamLiquid, a multi-regional eSports organization that takes a keen
interest in professional StarCraft II. The replay file is public at: http:
//lotv.spawningtool.com/23979/
SC2 Hours RTS Hours
Participant: Age, Gender, Major Casual Comp. Casual Comp.
Pair1-P1 41 M EE1 200 100 500 300
Pair1-P2 20 M ECE2 50 20 30 30
Pair2-P3 23 M CE 3 10 5 25 55
Pair2-P4 23 M ME4 100 200 50 0
Pair3-P5 21 M EE 50 0 150 12
Pair3-P6 27 M CE 15 2 150 10
Pair4-P7 23 M CE 40 20 20 30
Pair4-P8 28 F EnvE5 200 100 300 30
Pair5-P9 21 M BE6 40 40 100 0
Pair5-P10 19 M ECE 700 300 50 0
Pair6-P11 22 M BE 100 2 160 100
Pair6-P12 22 F EnvE 0 70 0 0
Pair7-P13 22 M CE 15 60 100 50
Pair7-P14 20 M BE 35 3 40 0
Pair8-P15 23 M CE 10 0 100 5
Pair8-P16 22 M BE7 16 1 15 0
Pair9-P17 21 M PS8 90 5 500 80
Pair9-P18 19 M ME 100 0 20 0
Pair10-P19 24 F FA9 5 5 0 0
Pair10-P20 23 M EdEn10 80 15 50 0
Table 1. Participant demographics and their casual vs. competitive
(Comp.) experience. SC2 is StarCraft II, and RTS is any other Real-
Time Strategy game.
1 Electrical Engr. 2 Electrical & Computer Engr. 3 Chemical Engr. 4 Mechanical
Engr. 5 Environmental Engr. 6 Biological Engr. 7 Business Entrepreneurship
8 Political Science 9 Fine Arts 10 Education & English
Pair10-P20: “Okay, I’ve not thought of that angle for
some reason: The AI trying to act like a human.”
Instead of using deception to simulate an intelligent agent
with a human player, an alternative design might use a replay
of a game with an intelligent agent playing. However, we
needed replay files with both interactive replay instrumentation
and high-quality gameplay. We were unable to locate an
intelligent agent in the RTS domain with high enough quality
for our investigation, i.e., without limitations like exploiting “a
strategy only successful against AI bots but not humans” [15].
Participants
We wanted participants familiar with the StarCraft user in-
terface and basic game elements, but without knowledge of
machine learning or AI concepts, so we recruited StarCraft
players at [a U.S. university] with at least 10 hours of prior
experience – but excluding computer science students. Also,
to avoid language difficulties interfering with the think-aloud
data, we accepted only participants with English as their pri-
mary language. As per these criteria, 20 undergraduate stu-
dents participated (3 females and 17 males), with ages ranging
from 19–41, whom we paired based on availability. Partici-
pants had an average of 93 hours of casual StarCraft experience
and 47 hours of competitive StarCraft experience (Table 1).
Procedures
Main Task’s Procedures
For the main task, each pair of participants interacted with a
16-minute StarCraft II replay while we video-recorded them.
The interactive replay instrumentation, shown in Figure 1,
allowed participants to actively forage for information within
the replay, and we gave them a short tutorial of its capabilities.
Examples of ways they could forage in this environment were
to move around the game map, move forward or backward in
When a participant paused the replay...
- What about that point in time made you stop there?
- Did you consider stopping on that object at any other point in time?
When a participant navigated to a patch...
- What about that part of the game interface/map made you click there?
- Did you consider clicking anywhere else on the game interface/map?
When a participant navigated away from a patch (or unpaused)...
- Did you find what you expected to find?
- What did you learn from that click/pause?
- Did you have a different goal for what to learn next?
Table 2. Interview questions (drawn from prior IFT research [32]), and
the triggers that caused us to ask them.
time, find out how many units each player possessed, and drill
down into specific buildings or units.
Participants watched and foraged together as a pair to try to
make sense of the agent’s decisions. One participant controlled
the keyboard and mouse for the first half of the replay, and
they switched for the second half. To help them focus on the
decisions, we asked them to write down key decision points,
which we defined for them as, “an event which is critically
important to the outcome of the game.” Whenever they en-
countered what they thought was a key decision point, they
were instructed to fill out a form with its time stamp, a note
about it, and which player(s) the decision point was about.
Retrospective Interview’s Procedures
After the main task, we conducted a multi-stage interview
based on the actions the participants took during the main
task. To add context to what participants wrote down during
the main task, we played parts of our recording of their main
task session, pausing along the way to ask why they chose the
decision points they did. The wording we used was: “In what
way(s) is this an important decision point in the game?”
We went through the main task recording again, pausing
at their navigations to ask the questions in Table 2. Since
there were too many to ask about them all, we sampled pre-
determined time intervals to enable covering several instances
of each type of navigation for all participant pairs.
Analysis Methods
To answer RQ1, we qualitatively coded instances in the main
task where participants asked a question out loud, using the
code set outlined later in Table 3. Our researchers had used
this code set on a different corpus [Removed for anonymized
review] in which they independently coded 34% of the corpus
and achieved 80% inter-rater reliability (IRR). In this study,
the same researchers who achieved this IRR split up the coding
of the current data.
To answer RQ2, we qualitatively analyzed the participants’
responses to the retrospective interview questions. To develop
a code set to answer the question “Why was the participant
seeking information?” we started with affinity diagramming to
generate groups of answers, which was performed by a group
of four researchers. The affinity diagram led to the follow-
ing codes: Monitoring State , Updating Game State , Obsolete
Domain, and New Event , as shown later in Table 5. Two
researchers then individually qualitatively coded the partici-
pants’ responses using this code set on 20% of the data. Given
Intelligibility Type Freq
What: What the player did or anything about game state.
-Pair3-P5: “So he just killed a scout right?” 148
What-could-happen: What the player could have done or what will
happen.
-Pair5-P10: “What’s he gonna do in response?” 16
Why-did: Why the player performed an action.
-Pair10-P20: “What was the point of that?” 14
How-to: Explaining rules, directives, audience tips, high level strate-
gies.
-Pair3-P5: “You have to build a cybernetics core, right?” 9
*How-good/bad-was-that-action: Evaluation of player actions.
-Pair10-P19: “Like, clearly it didn’t work the first time, is it worth
it to waste four units the second time?”
8
Why-didn’t: Why the player did not perform an action.
-Pair10-P20: “Why aren’t they attacking the base?” 7
Table 3. Intelligibility type code set, frequency data, and examples. The
code set is slightly modified (denoted by the asterisk) from the schema
proposed by Lim & Dey: We added How-good/bad-was-that-action
because the users wanted an evaluation of agent actions.
that our IRR on this portion was 80%, one researcher then
completed the rest of the coding alone.
To answer RQ3, we qualitatively coded the decision point
forms the participants used during the main task. Here again,
we developed a code set using affinity diagramming. The four
higher level codes we used were building/producing, scouting,
moving, and fighting. We coded 24% of the 228 identified
decision points according to this code set, and reached IRR of
80%, at which point one researcher coded the rest of the data.
RESULTS
RQ1: The Prey
To understand how predators seek prey in the RTS domain,
we analyzed questions participants asked during the main task.
To situate our investigation in the literature of humans trying
to understand AI, we coded the utterances using the Lim &
Dey intelligibility types [21] (Table 3).
The results were surprising. Although prior research has re-
ported Why questions to be much in demand [21, 22], only
10% of our participants’ questions fell into the Why did and
Why Didn’t categories combined (Table 4). Over 70% of our
participants’ questions pertained to What.
To get a sense of how representative our participants’ ques-
tions were, we turned to the experts — namely, professional
explainers in this domain, known as “shoutcasters.” Because
we were interested in the very best explainers in this domain,
we restricted our search for shoutcaster videos to those that
fit the description in the Methodology (top level tournament,
professional players). From this pool, we used the same code
set as Table 3 to analyze two professionally explained games:
Byun vs. Iasonu2 and Nerchio vs. Elazer3.
2Game 2 of Byun vs. Iasonu in the 2016 IEM Gyeonggi tournament,
available at: https://sc2casts.com/cast20681-Byun-vs-Iasonu-
BO3-in-1-video-2016-IEM-Gyeonggi-Group-Stage
3Game 2 of Nerchio vs. Elazer in the 2016 WCS Global Finals tourna-
ment, available at: https://sc2casts.com/cast20439-Nerchio-vs-
Elazer-BO3-in-1-video-2016-WCS-Global-Finals-Group-Stage
Question Total Pa
ir
1
Pa
ir
2
Pa
ir
3
Pa
ir
4
Pa
ir
5
Pa
ir
6
Pa
ir
7
Pa
ir
8
Pa
ir
9
Pa
ir
10
What 148 2 3 41 1 6 14 10 1 8 62
What-could-happen 16 1 1 3 1 1 2 7
Why-did 14 2 3 1 8
How-to 9 1 3 5
How-good/bad-was-
that-action
8 3 3 2
Why-didn’t 7 1 1 5
Total 202 4 4 51 1 12 18 12 1 10 89
Table 4. Frequency of Lim & Dey questions participants asked each
other, by session. Note how often What questions were asked, both by
the population of participants as a whole, and by few individual pairs,
where it was particularly prevalent.
Consistent with our participants’ questions, the shoutcast-
ers’ explanations were dominated by answers to What ques-
tions. In the Nerchio vs. Elazer game, shoutcasters answered
What questions 54% of the time, and in Byun vs. Iasonu they
provided What answers 48% of the time. Since shoutcasters
are hired to provide what game audiences want to know, their
consistency with our participants’ questions suggest that this
distribution of questions was typical for the domain.
The many flavors of “What” prey
Why such a difference from prior research results? One hy-
pothesis is that, in this kind of situation, participants’ prey was
simply “play-by-play” information. However, this hypothesis
is not well supported by the data. Although participants did
seek some play-by-play information (Pair3-P5: “...so he just
killed a scout, right?”), several common prey patterns in their
What questions went beyond play-by-play. Three of these
patterns accounted for about one-third of the What questions.
The “drill-down What” of current state: One common ques-
tion type participants asked when pursuing prey were ques-
tions that involved drilling down to find the desired informa-
tion. Half of the pairs asked drill-down What questions about
the game players’ unit production or composition. There were
21 instances of this type of What question alone, accounting
for almost 15% of the total What questions. For example, the
following question required the participants to drill down into
several structures on the map to answer it:
Pair3-P6: “Is the human building any new stuff now?”
Navigating in pursuit of this kind of prey was often costly. The
least expensive way was navigating via a drop-down menu
(2 clicks) in region 2 of Figure 1, but participants instead
often foraged in other ways. For example, to find the answer
to a question (like Pair3-P6’s earlier) participants sometimes
navigated to several unit producing structures on the map, into
a structure, and then on to the next. For example, Pair 3 made
seven navigations to answer their question about “building
new stuff.”
Shoutcasters’ comments closely matched the participants’ in-
terest in drilling down: 18% of shoutcasters’ What comments
answered drill-down questions, compared to the 15% of our
participants’ drill-down Whats. As an example of the match
to shoutcasters’ comments, Pair6-P12’s drill-down question
about unit composition: “I think, well, we have a varied com-
position, besides roaches, and what are these?” would be
well-matched to shoutcaster explanations such as these:
Shoutcaster for Byun v Iasonu: “[the player has] 41
zerglings at the moment.”
Shoutcaster for Nerchio v Elazer: “And 12 lings as well,
[and] that’s just a few more lings than you normally see.”
This suggests using shoutcasters as a possible content model
for future explanation systems, given that shoutcasters’ “sup-
ply” of explanations seem to match well with participants’
“demand” for explanations of this type.
The “temporal What” of past states: A second common prey
pattern, used by almost half (4 of the 10) participant pairs,
was asking What questions to fill in gaps regarding past states.
These accounted for 15 instances (about 10%) of their Whats.
Pair3-P6: “When did he start building [a] robotics facil-
ity?”
As in the drill-down pattern, the participants’ demand for
temporal Whats matched well with the shoutcasters’ supply:
about 10% of the shoutcasters’ What explanations reminded
listeners of some past event pertinent to current game state.
For example:
Shoutcaster for Byun v Iasonu: “...the plus 1 carapace
early upgrade ...[is] actually paying off.”
The “higher-level What”: The third common prey pattern was
at a higher level of abstraction than the specific units or events,
aiming instead toward more general understanding of what
was going on in the game. These What questions arose 12
times (about 8%) across all instances. For example, Pair10-
P20 asked, “What’s going on over there?” in which “there”
referred to a location on the map with military units that could
have been gearing up for combat. The shoutcasters seemed
enthusiastic about providing this kind of information4, perhaps
because it provided opportunities to add nuance and insight to
their commentary. For example:
Shoutcaster for Byun v Iasonu: “This is about to get
crazy because [of] this drop coming into the main base
[and] the banelings trying to get some connections in the
middle.”
Shoutcaster for Nerchio v Elazer: “I like Elazer’s po-
sition; he’s bringing in other units in from the back as
well.”
Questioning the unexpected
Lim & Dey’s reported that when a system behaved in un-
expected ways, users’ demand to know Why increased [21].
Consistent with this, when our participants saw what they ex-
pected to see, they did not ask Why or Why-didn’t questions.
For example, Pair 4 and Pair 5 did not ask any Why or Why
didn’t questions at all. Instead, they made remarks like the
following:
Pair4-P7: “the Zerg is doing what they normally do.”
4We did not count the number of shoutcaster comments that answered
this question because we could not narrow them down in this way.
That is, although many of their comments could be said to be applica-
ble to this type of question, the same comments were also applicable
to more specific questions.
Pair4-P8: “[The agent is] kind of doing the standard
things.”
Pair5-P10: “This is a standard build.”
However, in cases of the unexpected, a fourth What prey pat-
tern arose, in which participants questioned the phenomena
before them. We counted 9 What questions of this type:
Pair9-P17: “...interesting that it’s not even using those.”
Pair10-P19: “I don’t get it, is he expanding?”
Pair10-P19: “Wow, what is happening? This is a weird
little dance we’re doing.”
Pair10-P20: “<when tracking military units> What the
hell was that?”
The unexpected also produced Why questions. About half of
the participants’ Why and Why-Didn’t questions came from
seeing something they had not expected or not seeing some-
thing they had expected. For example:
Pair1-P1: “<noticing a large group of units sitting in a
corner> Why didn’t they send the big army they had?”
Pair10-P19: “Oh, look at all these Overlords. Why do
you need so many?”
Implications for a Future Interactive Explanation System
Using the Lim & Dey intelligibility types (What, Why, etc.) to
categorize the kinds of prey our participants sought produced
implications for shoutcasters as possible “gold standards” for
informing the design of a future automated explanation system
in this domain. For example, the high rate of What questions
from participants matched reasonably well with a high rate of
What answers from shoutcasters. Drawing explanation system
design ideas from these expert explainers may help inform the
needed triggers and content of the system’s What explanations.
Also, the dominance of What questions point to participants’
prioritizing of state information in this domain. Drill-down
Whats were about state information they hadn’t yet seen, tem-
poral Whats were about past states they either hadn’t seen
or had forgotten, and higher-level Whats were about under-
standing the purpose of a current or emerging state. Further,
the shoutcasters matched and sometimes exceeded the partic-
ipants’ rate of Whats in each of these categories with their
explanations. This suggests that in the RTS domain, an ex-
planation system’s most sought-after explanations may be its
explanations relating to state.
Also, as noted in prior research, unexpected behaviors (or
omissions of expected behaviors) led to increases in questions
of both the What and the Why intelligibility types [21]. If
an explanation system can recognize unexpected behavior, it
could then better predict when users will want Why and What
explanations to understand the deviation from typical behavior.
Finally, the cost of navigating to some of the prey at times
became expensive, which points to the need for explanation
systems to keep an eye on the cost to users of obtaining that
information. In this section, this came out in the form of
navigation actions. The next section will point to costs to
human cognition as well.
Reasons for participants’ path choices code set Freq
Monitoring State: Continuous game state monitoring, such as watch-
ing a fight.
-Pair4-P7: “I wanted to see how the fight was going.” 65
New Event : Attending to a new event for which participant wished
to satisfy curiosity about.
-Pair2-P4: “I saw there was a new building.” 36
Update Game State: Updating potentially stale game information
that the participant explicitly stated prior knowledge about.
-Pair1-P2: “I was mainly looking at the army composition, seeing
how it had changed from the last fight.”
29
Obsolete Domain: Explicitly using domain info that may not be
current, such as game rules (e.g., what buildings can produce).
-Pair3-P6: “I mainly clicked on the adept because I’m more familiar
with [a previous version of the game].”
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Table 5. Reasons for participants’ path choices code set, with examples
and frequency data, to answer the question “Why was the participant
seeking that information?”
Foraging in other environments Foraging in RTS environments
….
Figure 2. Conceptual drawing to contrast foraging in the RTS domain
with previously studied foraging. (Left): Information environments con-
sidered by past IFT literature look like this, where the paths the predator
considers are few, but sometimes very deep. This figure is inspired by a
programmer’s foraging situation in an IDE [[32] Fig. 5]. (Right): For-
aging in the RTS domain, where most navigation paths are shallow, but
with numerous paths to choose from at the top level.
RQ2: The Foraging Paths
Various cognitive costs were incurred by participants by fol-
lowing paths to find prey. As an information environment,
RTS games have foraging characteristics that set them apart
from other information environments that have previously
been studied from an IFT perspective, such as web sites [33]
and programming IDEs [32]. These previously studied do-
mains are relatively static, with most changes occurring over
longer periods. In contrast, an RTS information environment
changes rapidly and continually, driven by actions that do not
originate from the foragers themselves. As we will see, this
caused participants to spend some time monitoring the overall
game state, waiting for a suitable cue to appear for them to
investigate further.
The number of paths a forager might follow in an RTS infor-
mation environment increases with the complexity of the game
state, but path lengths tend to be short. This is conceptualized
in Figure 2. This means that most questions are answered
within a few navigations. However, in foraging environments
like IDEs, there might only be a few interesting links from any
one information patch, but some can lead to lengthy sequences
of navigations (e.g., the “Endless Paths” problem [32]).
Foraging in the RTS domain
Interestingly, there was hardly any difference between RTS
foraging and other environments at first. During the early
stages of a game, there are very few units, buildings, or ex-
plored regions for users to navigate to, so foraging is relatively
straightforward. As one participant put it:
Pair7-P14: “There is only so many places to click on at
this point.”
As long as this remained the case, each relevant path could
potentially be carefully pursued, similarly to an IDE. Four
participant pairs (2, 4, 7, 9) paused the replay for an average
of 90 seconds within the first 1:30. They studied individual
objects and actions with a great deal of scrutiny, which was
surprising considering the sparse environment. In contrast,
later on in the game, when 50 of the same unit existed, they
received much less attention than when there was just one.
Choosing among many available paths created cognitive chal-
lenges for participants. Participants needed to keep track of
an increasing amount of information as the match progressed.
Each time a player performed an action, which added infor-
mation, the participants could forage for this new information.
If the participant did so, we coded their navigation as a New
Event , which accounted for 26% of our interviewed naviga-
tions (Table 5). For example:
Pair10-P19: “...noticed movement in the Minimap, and
that the Zerg troops were mobilizing in some fashion. So
I guess I just preemptively clicked...”
The rate of path creation exacerbated the “many paths” prob-
lem. Professional StarCraft players regularly exceed several
hundred actions per minute (APM) [42]. This meant that
players performed rapid actions that changed the game state.
Each of these actions not only potentially created new paths;
they potentially updated the existing ones. This caused the
knowledge the participants had about paths that had not been
recently checked to become stale, which in turn led to a strong
prevalence of two behaviors. Update Game State was very
common in our data set, indicating that participants often
needed to check on paths that may have been updated (21% of
interviewed navigations, Table 5).
Pair8-P15: “...there’s a big force again. Just checking it
out to see if anything has progressed from earlier.”
Pair1-P2: “I was mainly just looking at the army compo-
sition, seeing how it had changed from the last fight, see
if they had made any serious changes ...”
Note that this is slightly different from our second behavior,
Monitoring State , which is like updating game state, but with
a nonspecific goal. Monitoring State was the most common
reason for interviewed navigations (46% of navigations were
for the purpose of monitoring, Table 5), for example:
Pair5-P9: “I noticed like the large mass of units on the
map and I wanted to know what the player was doing
with them.”
Pair8-P16: “I was just kinda checking on things. Sort of
due diligence keeping an eye on the different happenings
that the AI was doing at the time.”
Since each event and its corresponding cues were only visible
for a limited time, paths not chosen right away by our partici-
pants quickly disappeared. Further, paths are numerous, and
frequently updated. Thus, there is a large risk for paths of in-
quiry to be forgotten or going unnoticed as the game proceeds,
as in these examples:
Pair7-P14: “Oh my gosh, I didn’t even notice he was
making an ultralisk den.”
Pair3-P6: “I didn’t notice they canceled the assimilator”
Many Rapidly Updating Paths: Coping Mechanisms
Our participants responded to this issue in several ways. First,
some participants chose a path and stuck to it, ignoring the
others. Note that this required paying an information cost,
because contextual information that may have been very im-
portant for future decisions could be discarded in the process.
This strategy was exclusively followed by 3 pairs (2,7,8), who
made barely any temporal navigations during the study, as
described in Table 6. These participants analyzed the replay
using not much more time than shoutcasters spend. However,
achieving this speed of analysis required participants to ignore
many game events.
For example, when asked about desire to click anywhere else,
one participant volunteered:
Pair10-P19: “Mmm, if I had multiple, like, different
screens yeah. But no, that seemed to be where the action
was gonna be.”
In this fashion, participants chose to triage game events based
on some priority order. In both of the following examples, the
participants navigated away from the conclusion of a fight:
Pair6-P11: “I wanted to check on his production that one
time, because he just lost most of his army, and he still
had some [enemies] to deal with.”
Pair3-P5: “I was trying to see what units they were build-
ing, after the fight, see if they were replenishing, or get-
ting ready for another fight.”
The second method our participants used to manage the com-
plexity of paths was to use the time controls to slow down, stop,
or rewind the replay. Although pausing to assess the state was
fairly common in all groups, rewind behavior yielded more
information. Pairs 3 and 10 rewound the most often (Table 6),
and paid higher navigation costs to do so, but they viewed
these navigations as worthwhile to providing necessary infor-
mation:
Pair6-P11: “I looped back to the beginning of the final
fight ... to see if there was anything significant that we
had missed the first time around.”
However, the cost of doing so was more than just time, because
the more paths they monitored, the greater the cognitive load:
Pair10-P19: “There’s just so much happening all at once;
I can’t keep track of all of it!”
Implications for a Future Interactive Explanation System
Assessing an agent required considering a great many paths,
and choosing one (or few), though most paths followed were
not particularly long. Note that this contrasts with previous
literature in software engineering, which is characterized by
“miles of methods [32],” such as a long sequence of methods in
the stack trace. Thus, rapid evaluation and pruning of paths is
critical in the RTS domain, but less so in software engineering,
where the options to consider are fewer and time pressure is
Task Time Real-Time Ratio Rewinds Timestamp Rewinds Context Notes
Pair 1 20:48 1.3 3 1 Rewatched 1 fight
Pair 2 20:40 1.3 Extensive pause around 1:00 to evaluate game state
Pair 3 55:08 3.4 12 9 Rewatched fights and fight setup. Slowed down replay during 1 combat.
Pair 4 32:16 2.0 2 Rewatched opening build sequence and evaluated information available to the
agent at a key moment. Many pauses to explain game state.
Pair 5 24:23 1.5 5 Rewatched unit positioning, AI reaction to events, and scouting effectiveness.
Pair 6 31:56 2.0 4 2 Rewatched 2 fights.
Pair 7 29:49 1.9 Made no use of time controls other than pausing to write down decision points.
Pair 8 21:27 1.3 Made no use of time controls other than pausing to write down decision points.
Pair 9 39:17 2.4 2 1 Rewatched 1 fight. Slowed down replay for the entire task.
Pair 10 61:14 3.8 Lots Some Rewound extensively, in a nested fashion. Changed replay speed many times.
Table 6. Participant task time (33:42±14:18 minutes) and time control usage information. Note that the replay file was just over 16:04, so dividing each
pair’s time by 16 yields the third column, “Real-Time Ratio” (2.1±0.89). Some of times participants rewound the replay were because we requested
timestamps for events, shown in the fourth column, “Timestamp Rewinds.” The last column provides any additional context in which replay and pause
controls were used.
lighter. One solution could be a recommender system to help
the user triage which path to follow next.
During assessment, participants’ often forgot about or other-
wise interrupted their paths of inquiry. For example, if a new
important path appeared, such as a critical battle, either that
path or the current path had to be dropped. In another domain
(spreadsheet debugging), participants faced with branching
paths with multiple desirable directions became more effective
when the environment supported a strategy they call “to-do
listing” [11]. Because to-do listing was supported on its own or
in composition of other problem-solving approaches, it could
also act as a strategy enhancer. Perhaps in the RTS domain,
a similar strategy could enable users to carry on with their
current path uninterrupted — but also keep track of the critical
battle to come back to later.
RQ3: The Decisions and the Cues
When participants were not heading down the “right” path,
what cues did they instead follow toward some other path?
Also, what did they consider the “right” cues to follow?
In the RTS domain, players and intelligent agents make thou-
sands of sequential decisions, and there is a paucity of litera-
ture that considers humans trying to understand AI decisions
in such a setting. (A notable exception is McGregor et al. [24].)
There is, however, literature that starts with the AI’s perspec-
tive: instances of its decision-making system components (i.e.,
neurons) that are interpretable by humans [43, 44]. In contrast,
here we wanted to start with the human’s perspective and the
foraging paths that result from it: namely, how participants
would identify behaviors that were not only potentially human
interpretable, but also of interest.
Thus, we asked participants to write down what they thought
were the important game events. We defined the term key deci-
sion points to our participants as “an event which is critically
important to the outcome of the game,” to give participants
leeway to apply their own meaning. Since all participant pairs
were examining the same replay file, we were then able to
compare the decision points the different participants selected.
That is, the cues in the information environment were the same
for all the participants — whether they noticed them or not.
Key decision points fell into four main categories: build-
ing/producing, fighting, moving, and scouting. The partici-
Code Total Pa
ir
1
Pa
ir
2
Pa
ir
3
Pa
ir
4
Pa
ir
5
Pa
ir
6
Pa
ir
7
Pa
ir
8
Pa
ir
9
Pa
ir
10
Expansion 52 7 7 8 8 - 6 3 - 7 6
Building - Rest 69 6 4 7 15 1 7 11 2 12 4
Building - All 114 13 11 15 21 1 12 12 2 18 9
Fighting - All 98 8 4 11 8 4 10 6 8 11 28
Moving - All 26 3 1 5 1 2 2 2 2 3 5
Scouting - All 23 1 2 1 5 1 1 3 - 3 6
Total 228 34 20 40 45 11 31 39 16 42 65
Table 7. Summary of decision points identified by our participants.
Sums may exceed totals, since each decision point could have multiple
labels. Note how prevalent Expansion was within the Building category.
pants were in emphatic agreement about the most important
types of decision points to pursue. Of the 228 total decision
points particpants identified, Fighting and Building made up
85% (Table 7).
In fact, participants showed remarkable consistency about
the importance of the Expansion subcategory of Building.
Eight of the ten participant pairs identified Expansion deci-
sion points, when a player chooses to build a new resource-
producing base (Table 7). Extra resources from expanding
allowed a player to gain an economic advantage over their
opponent because they could build more units:
Pair1-P2: “Of course, if you have a stronger economy
you will likely win in the end.”
Moreover, because those that identified any Expansion found
at least three, Expansions seemed to be considered important
throughout the duration of the game.
Pair6-P11: “... the third base is important for the same
reason the first one was, because it was just more produc-
tion and map presence.”
Even so, they missed some of the cues pointing out expansion
decisions. The event logs in the replay file reveal that new
bases were constructed at roughly {1:00, 1:30, 2:00, 5:00,
6:30, 11:20, 12:00, and 13:45}, each of which is marked with
a red line on Figure 3. Only Pair 3 identified decision points
for all 8 of these, and 7 pairs omitted at least one5, with one
example highlighted with a red box in Figure 3.
5 Table 7 shows Pair 4 also finding eight Expansion decision points,
but one of those is about the commitment to expand, based on building
other structures to protect the base, rather than the action of building
the base itself.
Figure 3. All Building-Expansion decision points identified by our
participants (y-axis), with game time on the x-axis. Expansion events
are known to have occurred in the replay file at roughly: {1:00, 1:30,
2:00, 5:00, 6:30, 11:20, 12:00, and 13:45}. Each of these times is demar-
cated on the figure with a red vertical line, often coinciding with decision
points. Consider the red box, where Pair 4 failed to notice an event they
likely wanted to note, based on their previous and subsequent behavior.
Figure 4. (Top:) All Scouting decision points identified by our partici-
pant pairs (y-axis), with game time on the x-axis. (Bottom:) All Fighting
decision points identified, plotted on the same axes. The red line that
passes through both images denotes roughly the time at which Fighting
events begin. Notice that after this time, many Fighting decision points
are identified, but Scouting decision points are no longer noticed often –
despite important Scouting actions continuing to occur.
Since Expansion decisions were so important to our partic-
ipants, why did they miss some? “Distractor cues” in the
information environment led participants on other paths6. Par-
ticipants were so distracted by cues that provided an alluring
scent, albeit to low-value information, they did not notice the
other cues that pointed toward the “Expansion” decisions.
Distractor cues led participants astray from Expansion in nine
cases, and eight of them involved units in combat or potentially
entering combat. (The ninth involved being distracted by a
scouting unit.) For example, Pair 7 missed the expansion at the
13:45 minute mark, instead choosing to track various groups
of army units, which turned out to be unimportant to them:
Pair7-P14: “These zerglings are still just chilling.”
6Reminder: Cues are the signposts in the environment that the preda-
tor observes, such as rabbit tracks. Scent, on the other hand, is what
the predators make of cues in their heads, such as thinking that rabbit
tracks will lead to rabbits.
Interestingly, participants had trouble with distractor cues even
when the number of events competing for their attention was
very low. For example, in the early stages of the game, players
were focused on building economies and scouting. There was
little to no fighting yet, so it was not the source of distract-
ing cues. We were not surprised that the Expansion event
at 13:45, when the game state had hundreds of objects and
events, was the most often missed (5 instances). However,
we were surprised that even when the game state was fairly
simple — such as at 1:30 where the game had only 13 objects
— participants missed the Expansion events. The extent of
distractibility the partipants showed even when so little was
going on was beyond what we expected.
So if decision points went unnoticed in simple game states,
what did they notice in complex ones? Fighting. All par-
ticipants agreed Fighting was key, identifying at least one
decision point of that type (Table 7). The ubiquity of Fight-
ing codes is consistent with Kim et al. [15], who found that
combat ratings were the most important to the participant’s
perception score. Fighting provided such a strong scent that
it was able to mask most other sources of scent, even those
which participants prioritized very highly.
Scouting offers an example of Fighting leading participants
away from other important patches. Scouting decision points
occurred in the first half of the game, but died out once Fight-
ing decision points started to occur in the second half of the
game. As Figure 4 shows, the start of Fighting decision points
coincides with the time that Scouting decision points vanish —
despite the fact that scouting occurred throughout the game,
and that participants believed scouting information mattered:
Pair4-P8: “But it’s important just to know what they’re
up to and good scouting is critical to know who you are
going to fight.”
Implications for a Future Interactive Explanation System
Participants had a tendency toward following cues that were in-
teresting or eye-catching, at the expense of those that were im-
portant but more mundane. In this domain, the “eye-catching”
cues were combat-oriented, whereas the “mundane” cues were
scouting oriented. Other domains may have similar phenom-
ena, wherein certain aspects of the agent’s behaviors distract
from other important views due to triggering an emotional
response in the viewer. Thus, supporting users’ attending to
actions that are important but mundane is a design challenge
for future interactive explanation systems.
THREATS TO VALIDITY
Every study has threats to validity [41]. This paper presents
the first study of information foraging either in the area of
explainable AI or in the domain of RTS games, so its results
cannot yet be compared or validated by other studies by other
researchers. Thus, we must be conscious of its limitations.
Aspects of our study may have influenced our participants to
ask less questions in general, such as not asking a question of
their partner if they did not expect their partner to be able to
answer it. Also, participants took different amounts of time
to do the task, ranging from 20 minutes to an hour. Thus,
certain participant pairs talked more than others in the main
task, creating a form of sampling bias. Threats like these can
be addressed only by additional empirical studies across a
spectrum of study designs, types of intelligent interfaces, and
intelligent agents.
DISCUSSION: WHAT IFT CAN OFFER EXPLAINABLE AI
At this point, we step back to consider insights an Information
Foraging Theory perspective can bring to Explainable AI.
Perhaps most important, the theory allows us to “connect the
dots” between our work and other work done from an IFT
perspective. It does so by enabling us to abstract beyond
game-specific puzzlements to constructs grounded in a well-
established theory for humans’ information seeking behaviors.
Thus, we used IFT to abstract above game objects like “assim-
ilators” to the IFT constructs of prey (RQ1), foraging along
paths (RQ2), and why they followed the cues they followed
(RQ3). The IFT lens revealed that participants faced difficult
foraging problems – some of which are new to IFT research –
and faced high foraging costs. For example, failure to follow
the “right” paths resulted in a high information cost being paid,
but finding a reasonable path needed to be done quickly due
to the ever-changing game environment (at a high cognitive
cost). Although the user could relax the real-time pressure
by pausing the replay, excessive rewinding incurred not only
a high navigation cost for rewind-positioning and pausing,
but also an additional cognitive cost of remembering more
context.
Participants had to make trade offs between two types of these
costs, navigational and informational, and their triaging to
manage such trade-offs led to even more cognitive cost. Each
path participants followed incurred a navigational cost, so
following more paths led to higher cumulative costs. How-
ever, reducing the number of paths they followed incurred
the information cost of missing out on potentially important
information. Worse, the information cost paid by adhering to
a single path compounded over time. For example, if partici-
pants made a bad path choice early in the game, and repeated
that mistake throughout the game, then later in the game they
may be confused by an event that they did not expect — due
to lacking appropriate context. One cause for making a bad
choice was “distractor cues,” where, in order to curtail their
current navigation direction and move to another, participants
paid the high information cost of missing information impor-
tant to them, often unwittingly.
The IFT perspective also connects some of the problems our
participants faced to known problems of foraging in other
domains. One open problem in IFT is the Prey in Pieces prob-
lem7 [32]. Our participants encountered this problem because
they had to piece together bits of evidence of the agent’s de-
cisions in order to assess the agent. In doing so, participants
were sometimes uncertain about what each of these decisions
7Piorkowski et al. described “Prey in Pieces” as if getting a cof-
feemaker meant a shopper had to buy individual parts at different
stores, then finally piece them together. The cost of going to every
store must be paid plus the cost of piecing things together at the end,
rather than the cost of going to one store that has a preassembled
coffeemaker.
meant about the competencies and strategies of the agent.
When aggregating multiple sources of uncertain data like this,
prior research has shown that computational assistance can
increase user confidence, although manual comparison is still
preferred in high-stakes situations [10]. This seems to sug-
gest that a recommender may be helpful to help users select
and aggregate agent actions for explanation, though manual
comparison may still be necessary at times.
Another open problem in IFT is the Scaling Up problem [32].
This problem was revealed in the domain of IDEs, in which
foragers (developers) had great difficulty accurately predicting
the cost and value of going to patches more than one link away.
The problem that the developers faced was a depth problem
(recall Figure 2). In contrast, in our domain, participants faced
a breadth Scaling Up foraging problem: constantly having
to choose which of many paths to follow. The Scaling Up
problem as a depth problem is still open; so too is the breadth
version of it identified here.
In both cases, users foraging for information want to maxi-
mize value per cost. In the IDE case, this is accomplished
by pruning low value paths unrelated to the bug. For exam-
ple, if a developer is fixing a UI bug, they can potentially
ignore database code. However, in RTS, any action could be
important, so many paths need to stay on the table. Further,
the rapid rate of change in the environment limits the user’s
planning depth, which decreases accuracy of predictions of
cost/value. Thus, the Scaling Up problem is different in the
RTS domain. In depth domains like IDEs, the problem is
predicting cost/value in far-distant patches, whereas in the
RTS domain, the difficulty is rapidly choosing at the top level
among the many, many available paths.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first theory-based investigation
into how people forage for information about an intelligent
agent in an RTS environment and the implications for Explain-
able AI. Our results suggest that people’s information seeking
in this domain is far from straightforward. We saw evidence
of this from multiple perspectives:
RQ1 The Prey: Participants favored What information over
the Whys reported by most previous research, and their
Whats were nuanced, complex, and sometimes expensive.
RQ2 The Paths: The dynamically changing RTS environment
and the breadth-oriented structure of its information paths
caused unique information foraging problems in deciding
which paths to traverse. These problems led not only to
navigation costs, but also to information and cognitive
costs.
RQ3 The Decisions and the Cues: These costs rendered it
infeasible for participants to investigate all of the decision
points they wanted. This problem was exacerbated by “dis-
tractor cues,” which drew participants’ attention elsewhere
with interesting-looking cues (like signs of fighting), at
the expense of information that was often important to
participants (like scouting or expansion).
Perhaps most importantly, our results point to the benefits
of investigating humans’ understanding of intelligent agents
through the lens of Information Foraging Theory. For example,
the IFT lens enabled us to abstract beyond StarCraft, to reveal
phenomena – such as the frequent need to trade off cognitive
foraging costs against navigation foraging costs against infor-
mation costs – that are widely relevant to the RTS domain.
As we have noted in the “Implications” sections along the
way, these theory-based results reveal opportunities for future
Explainable AI systems to enable domain experts to find the
information they need to understand, assess, and ultimately
decide how much to trust their intelligent agents.
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